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Comments
Inviting Injustice: Why the Rhode
Island Supreme Court Should
Publish Opinions for All Criminal
Case Decisions
INTRODUCTION
The Justices of the Rhode Island Supreme Court select which
of their cases will become published opinions and which will not.'
The rationale of the decisions made by each of the five justices is
1. Pursuant to section 8-1-3 of the Rhode Island General Laws, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court "shall render written opinions in all cases decided by it
wherein points of law, pleading, or practice, have arisen which are novel or of suffi-
cient importance to warrant written opinions." R.I. GEN. LAws § 8-1-3 (2002). All
such opinions are published. The Rhode Island Supreme Court makes a distinc-
tion between such opinions, which are written for cases decided by the court en
banc after the submission of briefs and oral arguments by the parties, and orders.
Article I 12A of the Rhode Island Supreme Court Rules provides that parties in-
volved with an appeal to the supreme court may be made to appear before a single
justice of the court for a conference, after which the justice may issue an order
requiring the parties to show cause why the issues raised by the appeal should not
be decided via a "show cause argument." Such an argument in a criminal case is
heard either "by the full court or by as many members of the court as are availa-
ble." R.I. SuP. CT. R. ART. I 12A(5) (2002). After the show cause argument, the
court may issue an order or opinion reversing or modifying the judgment, remand-
ing the case to the trial court for further proceedings, or dismissing the appeal,
which is what occurred in State v. Gonsalves, No. 2000-256-C.A. (R.I. Feb. 8, 2002).
Such an order may or may not be published, which is decided by the justices in a
private conference. Also important to note is Article I 16(h) of the Rhode Island
Supreme Court Rules, enacted in 1998, which states, "Unpublished orders will not
be cited by the court in its opinions and such orders will not be cited by counsel in
their briefs. Unpublished orders shall have no precedential effect." For the sake of
simplicity, throughout this Comment the term "decisions" will be used to refer to
all cases decided and disposed of by the Rhode Island Supreme Court.
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unknowable for certain,2 but in at least one case, State v. Gon-
salves,3 the court opted to not publish its order for a criminal case
decision in which it arguably disregarded the law of the United
States Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court.
This Comment will argue that, in Gonsalves, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court erred by failing to grant the defendant a new trial
based on his claim that he had been denied his Sixth Amendment
right to cross-examine a key prosecution witness about her poten-
tial bias against him. This Comment will also point out what may
be more disturbing - that in its unpublished order 4 the court did
not even take up this constitutional issue.
One purpose of this Comment is to bring to light an instance in
which the Rhode Island Supreme Court fell short of meeting its
duty to the people of the State of Rhode Island by (1) failing to give
adequate consideration to a case with clear implications for citi-
zens' right to a fair trial and (2) electing to withhold its order in
Gonsalves from public scrutiny by not publishing it. Another, more
broad, purpose of this Comment is to encourage greater accounta-
bility on the part of the Rhode Island Supreme Court and its deci-
sions through such public scrutiny. In an effort to move toward
that ultimate end of accountability, as well as for other reasons
discussed within, it is the thesis of this Comment that the Rhode
Island Supreme Court should publish opinions for all of its crimi-
nal case decisions. 5
2. Justice Robert G. Flanders, Jr. of the Rhode Island Supreme Court has
stated that all criminal case decisions by the court are not published so as not to
"clutter up the law books" with case opinions that rely on settled law and thus
merely repeat what has been said many times before in published opinions. Inter-
view with Robert G. Flanders, Jr., Associate Justice, Rhode Island Supreme Court,
in Providence, R.I. (Nov. 20, 2002). Justice Flanders also stated that the factors
taken into consideration when the justices decide whether a given case will yield a
published opinion or order basically hinge on what, if any, precedential value the
case would likely have. Id. He further stated that it is not only for the efficiency of
the court that the court limits its published opinions, but also for the ease and
efficiency of practicing attorneys who should not have to spend time reading cases
that have no value beyond deciding the case for the parties involved. Id.
3. No. 2000-256-C.A. (R.I. Feb. 8, 2002) [hereinafter Gonsalves].
4. See infra text accompanying note 37.
5. There is quite a bit of case law, legislative history and scholarly material
on a related, but distinct, discussion regarding the citability, non-citability, and
potential precedential value of unpublished opinions. Though many of the argu-
ments in this Comment may also be applicable to that related discussion, and
INVITING INJUSTICE
The question must be asked, why advocate publication of opin-
ions for all criminal case decisions, but not civil? Rhode Island's
court system has just one appellate court, its supreme court. There
are just five justices on the Rhode Island Supreme Court. These
five justices likely would not be able to bear the workload that
would accompany the implementation of a system in which they
are required to write a publishable opinion for every decision they
make.6 Therefore, although as former United States Supreme
Court Chief Justice Warren Burger once pointed out,
"[c]onvenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives - or
the hallmarks - of democratic government. . . "7 if requiring publi-
cation of an opinion for every decision of the Rhode Island Supreme
Court would be either impossible or crippling to the judicial system
of the State of Rhode Island, then it should not be undertaken.
Though publication of opinions for all Rhode Island Supreme Court
decisions might be the ideal situation, it is by necessity that this
Comment herein advocates the publication of opinions for all crim-
inal cases decided by the Rhode Island Supreme Court.
There are also basic differences between criminal and civil
cases that lead to this Comment's advocacy for publication of opin-
ions for all criminal but not all civil case decisions. First, criminal
cases are different from civil cases because of the potential in crim-
inal cases for the oppression of an individual or class of individuals
by the government, by bringing charges against and prosecuting
that individual or class of individuals. Second, criminal charges
brought against an individual bring with them the possibility of
imprisonment. The taking of a person's liberty (or even in some
states and the federal system a person's life, though not in Rhode
Island) is inherently a greater deprivation than the taking of a per-
son's property, which may happen as a result of a civil judgment.
Third, there is a stigma attached to being charged with and/or con-
victed of a crime that is not equaled in the civil context. When a
person has a criminal record it will likely follow that person for-
ever and become a factor in every part of his life. A civil judgment
though for many reasons similar to those discussed herein it seems likely that
unpublished opinions should be citable (though not binding as precedent), that is
not the topic of this Comment.
6. As an aside, it is arguable, and possibly even likely, that the State of
Rhode Island is in need of an intermediate appellate court. That is also a topic for
another article, however.
7. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945 (1983).
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against an individual or a corporation simply does not typically en-
gender the same degree of social disapproval or stigma.
Part I of this Comment, an analysis of State v. Gonsalves, pro-
vides a real criminal case as background for Parts II and III, which
discuss why all Rhode Island Supreme Court criminal case deci-
sions should yield published opinions. Part II, in light of this Com-
ment's perceived goals of a criminal justice system, argues that all
criminal case decisions should yield published opinions because
every case that comes before the Rhode Island Supreme Court has
precedential value, since any case may be factually comparable to
another and, thereby, be valuable. Also, although unpublished or-
ders are not citable by attorneys as precedent, trial judges may be
tempted to use unpublished orders as a type of unofficial prece-
dent, in an effort to ensure that their decisions at the trial level are
not overturned on appeal. Part II also presents what may be the
strongest argument for publication of opinions for all Rhode Island
Supreme Court criminal case decisions - to control the quality, the
thoughtfulness, the accurateness, and, ultimately, the legal cor-
rectness of those decisions.
Part III discusses two policy concerns of the State of Rhode
Island. It posits that publication of opinions for all criminal case
decisions will go far towards fostering both the appearance and the
reality of a much-needed open and accessible government in the
State of Rhode Island, and it highlights the idea that the Rhode
Island Supreme Court, because of the size of its state and its prac-
tice of publishing opinions for the majority of its criminal case deci-
sions already,8 is in a unique position to be able to publish opinions
for all of its criminal case decisions, in the process acting as an
example of open and accessible government for other states and
court systems. This Comment concludes with some thoughts on
the ever-elusive idea of justice and how it is defined and achieved.
I. STATE V. GONSALVES
The purpose of the discussion of State v. Gonsalves at both the
trial and appellate levels is to provide an example case as back-
ground for the assertion that all Rhode Island Supreme Court
8. See infra Appendix.
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criminal case decisions should yield published opinions.9 There
are two main issues that arise from the trial court's ruling that the
defendant could not introduce evidence relevant to the bias of the
complaining witness. The first is a Rhode Island Rules of Evidence
issue, and the second is a federal constitutional issue. Both of
these issues should have been considered, but were not, by the trial
court and by the Rhode Island Supreme Court.
It is particularly important to discuss the supreme court's in-
attention to the constitutional issue as a matter that should be of
concern to the people of Rhode Island. In theory the Rhode Island
Supreme Court serves as an intermediate appellate court when it
comes to deciding constitutional issues. However, the United
States Supreme Court agrees to hear and decide so few cases that
the Rhode Island Supreme Court effectively serves as a court of
last resort not only on state issues, but also, usually, on constitu-
tional issues.
A. The Trial
The facts of this case were in dispute at the trial in December
of 1999, and the disparities between the defendant's story and that
of the complaining witness will not, and cannot, be resolved here.
This account is an attempt to frame the facts of the case in a way
that (1) both the defendant's version and the complaining witness's
version of the events of October 9, 1998 will be clear and (2) the
reader will have the opportunity to evaluate the key issues being
discussed with respect to this case in their proper context.
Wayne DaRosa Gonsalves and Robin Carter began dating in
1994.10 By 1998 they were living together in Providence and were
making plans to marry." However, their relationship ended on
October 8, 1998 when they had an argument and Carter told Gon-
salves to move out of their apartment. 12 The next morning Carter
obtained a restraining order against Gonsalves, claiming that he
had assaulted her three weeks earlier.' 3 That same day Carter
9. No stance is taken in this Comment as to whether the defendant in State
v. Gonsalves was guilty or not guilty. It is not the verdict of the jury with which
issue is being taken, but the processes and rulings delivered at trial and on appeal.





358 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:353
contacted Gonsalves to arrange for him to pick up his belongings
from the apartment, and Gonsalves told her that he would be there
by 5:30 p.m. 14
Upon arriving at the designated time, Gonsalves entered the
apartment and began to pack his belongings and carry them to his
vehicle. 15 While he was collecting his belongings, he and Carter
were engaged in what both parties agreed was a heated argu-
ment. 16 At this point, Carter's and Gonsalves's stories diverged.
Carter claimed that Gonsalves assaulted her by grabbing her by
the neck and pinning her up against a wall until she was able to
break free and run away. 17 Gonsalves claimed that no such thing
happened and that, while he was in an argument with Carter, he
did not come into physical contact with her in any way.18
As a result of Carter's accusation of assault against Gonsalves,
he was criminally charged with and tried for simple domestic as-
sault.19 The issue to be discussed in this Comment arises from
Gonsalves's contention that Carter completely fabricated the as-
sault story. Gonsalves claimed that Carter invented the assault
story because after a previous incident where Carter smashed
Gonsalves's windshield with a baseball bat she had pled nolo con-
tendre, or no contest, to a charge of domestic malicious damage,
was placed on probation for one year, and was required to attend
domestic violence counseling. 20 Most importantly, Gonsalves also
contended that during the time Carter was attending the domestic
violence counseling she repeatedly made statements to the effect
that she wished that he had to go to domestic violence counseling
as well. 2 1
Prior to the trial, the court determined that Gonsalves's attor-
ney would not be allowed to cross-examine Carter regarding this
previous incident in order to establish an evidentiary basis for the
claim that Carter was biased against the defendant and concocted
14. Pre-Briefmg Statement of the Defendant-Appellant at 4, State v. Gon-
salves, No. 2000-256-C.A. (R.I. Feb. 8, 2002) (on file with author).
15. Trial Record at 150, State v. Gonsalves, C.A. No. P3/98-4505A (R.I. Super.
Ct. filed June 13, 2000).
16. Id. at 29, 149.
17. Gonsalves, supra note 3, at 2.
18. Record at 184, Gonsalves (No. P3/98-4505A-C.A.).
19. Gonsalves, supra note 3, at 2.
20. Record at 7-8, Gonsalves (No. P3/98-4505A-C.A.).
21. Id. at 8.
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her story of assault. The trial transcript relevant to this issue
reads as follows: 2 2
THE COURT: Now, the criminal record of the complaining
witness. I understand that there is no 60923 testimony that
is being offered; that what is being offered, instead, is evi-
dence in accordance with 404(b).2 4 Am I correct about that,
counsel for the State?
PROSECUTION: Correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And counsel for the defendant, who would be
seeking to offer this evidence, am I correct that you'd be offer-
ing it under 404(b), not under 609?
DEFENSE: Given that choice, yes, 404(b).
THE COURT: So you're talking about a prior bad act, not a
conviction -
DEFENSE: Not a conviction.
THE COURT: -with a sentence. All right. And as I under-
stand it, several years earlier, there was a charge of domestic
assault, a simple assault.
PROSECUTION: It was domestic mal. damage.
THE COURT: Domestic.
PROSECUTION: Domestic malicious damage.
THE COURT: Domestic malicious damage, with the com-
plaining witness, or the victim so to speak being the plaintiff
22. The entire portions of both the trial court transcript and the supreme
court order that are relevant to the issues discussed in this Comment are included
within. This is both because they are not overly lengthy and because it is impor-
tant that the reader have the opportunity to read the discussions of the issues in
the trial and supreme courts in their entirety and to see for herself the scarcity of
attention paid to the constitutional issue.
23. Rule 609 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence states:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the
witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from the
witness or established by public record. "Convicted of a crime" includes
(1) pleas of guilty, (2) pleas of nolo contendre followed by a sentence (i.e.
fine or imprisonment), whether or not suspended and (3) adjudications of
guilt.
R.I. R. EVID. 609(a). Robin Carter had not been convicted of a crime as defined in
Rule 609, so this rule was not applicable to the admissibility of her criminal record.
24. Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence states:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity
therewith, It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, iden-
tity, absence of mistake or accident, or to prove that defendant feared im-
minent bodily harm and that the fear was reasonable.
R.I. R. EvID. 404(b).
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[sic] herein, and the defendant being the victim in that mat-
ter, sort of the reverse, victim and perpetrator there. Was
counseling ordered as a result?
PROSECUTION: I believe she actually received a year's pro-
bation and domestic violence counseling.
THE COURT: She did?
PROSECUTION: Which would still not be a conviction under
409 purposes.
THE COURT: 6-
PROSECUTION: 609, excuse me.
THE COURT: I'm talking about 404(b), here. Under 404(b), I
am unclear, or under 608,25 I guess is really what you'd be
moving it under, I'm unclear as to how it falls within the pur-
view of any rule of evidence, since you're not offering it under
609.
Can you tell me how it falls in - give me your rule and give
me your argument.
DEFENSE: I'm sorry, I can't give you the rule.
THE COURT: Tell me what - if you don't know the rule num-
ber, tell me what you think. Why does it come in, and I'll
match it up to some rule.
DEFENSE: I think it comes in because it shows bias; bias by
the complaining witness against my client, her inclination to
color her testimony against him in this case. The evidence
that they're [sic] seeking to bring in is not so much the prior
malicious damage, but the fact she had to go to domestic vio-
lence counseling, she was upset about that and had said to
my client, at least on one occasion, that something to the ef-
fect: How would you feel if you had to go through it? And
based on that -
THE COURT: I'm sorry. Sheriff.
THE SHERIFF: Yes.
25. Rule 608 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence states:
Specific instances of conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or
supporting the witness' credibility, other than conviction of a crime as pro-
vided in Rule 609, or, in the discretion of the trial judge, evidence of prior
similar false accusations, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They
may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or
untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1)
concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or
(2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another
witness as to which the witness being cross-examined has testified.
R.I. R. EvID. 608(b).
INVITING INJUSTICE
THE COURT: The jury is coming, so we'll have the two people
move. Hold on. Sheriff, hold one moment, please. Why don't
we have - yes, exactly. You're a student, right?
FROM THE ARRAY: Yes.
THE COURT: You're committing yourself to sit here during
the impanelment; is that your pleasure?
FROM THE ARRAY: Yes.
THE COURT: Very well.
DEFENSE: It goes to bias.
THE COURT: Why don't you take one seat away - stay where
you are. The student. Move one away. I have two people
moving. The student, move. There you go. So it doesn't look
like you're together. I don't want to give the wrong impres-
sion, and I'll explain to the jury why she is sitting there, just
because I don't want to confuse anybody.
Well, it would seem to me, Rule 608 goes to evidence of char-
acter and conduct of the witness, and I do not see that specific
instances of conduct of the witness for purposes of supporting
or attacking the credibility of that witness, would be admissi-
ble in the discretion of the trial justice.
Evidence of prior similar, false accusations may not be proven
by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion
of the Court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be
inquired into on cross-examination. This is not a situation
where she had previously accused him of similar conduct.
We're talking about something totally different. And we're
talking - I don't think that - I think this is remote, and I'm
going to exclude it under 403 as any probative value would be
substantially outweighed by the prejudice, and I know of no
rule under which it would be admissible.
Was there any other issue? Yes? No? There was nothing
else. I think I took care of everything.26
First, in this exchange the judge asked the defense counsel for
a rule of evidence with which the cross-examination evidence could
be admitted. However, assuming that the evidence was relevant,
then the evidence was presumptively admissible unless the oppo-
nent of the evidence, here the prosecution, provided a reason why
the evidence should not be admitted.2 7 The prosecutor was never
26. Trial Record at 6-9, State v. Gonsalves, C.A. No. P3/98-4505A (R.I. Super.
Ct. filed June 13, 2000).
27. R.I. R. Evid. 402. Rule 402 states:
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States, by the Constitution of Rhode Island, by
2003]
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asked for, nor did she offer, a reason why the evidence should not
be admitted.
Second, the evidence was relevant. The Rhode Island Rules of
Evidence define relevant evidence as "evidence having any ten-
dency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence."28 The "any tendency" stan-
dard for admissibility is a low bar for a proponent of evidence to
meet. The evidence that the defendant sought to have admitted
did have some tendency to lead a jury to think it was more proba-
ble that the complaining witness was fabricating her story of as-
sault than it was without the evidence, which was certainly a fact
of consequence to the determination of the case. Therefore, it was
relevant.
Third, the judge focused on and assumed that the evidence
was being offered as evidence of character. However, the defense
attorney's argument was that the purpose of the evidence was to
show that the complaining witness was biased against the defen-
dant and had fabricated her story, not to show that because the
complaining witness had been arrested for domestic malicious
damage she was a bad person and thus should not be believed.
Having been denied admission of the evidence of Carter's po-
tential motive to fabricate the story of assault, Gonsalves was con-
victed of simple domestic assault and placed on probation for one
year.29 Although the trial judge had the responsibility for admit-
ting or excluding the proffered evidence, trial judges can make mis-
takes. Rulings on evidentiary issues can be made quickly, as the
trial judge also has the responsibility to control her courtroom and
move along cases on her docket in a rapid fashion. This is one rea-
son why it is necessary for all criminal defendants to have the right
to appeal convictions to a higher court. Gonsalves did exercise that
right to appeal his conviction to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.
In that appeal, Gonsalves's appellate counsel fully briefed the
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause issue regarding the poten-
Act of Congress, by the General Laws of Rhode Island, by these rules, or
by other rules applicable in the courts of this state. Evidence which is not
relevant is not admissible.
Id.
28. R.I. R. EVID. 401.
29. Gonsalves, supra note 3, at 2.
INVITING INJUSTICE
tial bias of the complaining witness, 30 yet in its unpublished order
of February 8, 2002 the Rhode Island Supreme Court did not ad-
dress this issue.31
B. The Rhode Island Supreme Court's Review of the Case
Rule 12A of Article I of the Rhode Island Supreme Court Rules
provides that parties of an appeal to the supreme court may be
made to appear before a single justice of the court for a conference,
after which the justice may issue an order requiring the parties to
show cause why the issues raised by the appeal should not be de-
cided after hearing a "show cause argument."32 Such an argument
in a criminal case is heard either "by the full court or by as many
members of the court as are available."33 After the show cause ar-
gument, the court may issue an order or opinion reversing or modi-
fying the judgment, remanding the case to the trial court for
further proceedings, or dismissing the appeal. 34 In the appeal of
State v. Gonsalves, the supreme court dismissed Gonsalves's ap-
peal after hearing a show cause argument and being presented
with briefs for both parties. 35
The portion of the Rhode Island Supreme Court's order rele-
vant to this issue reads as follows:
The defendant first argues that the trial justice erred by re-
fusing to allow him to introduce evidence about a prior do-
mestic dispute with Carter that occurred some years before
the fracas in this case. Following that incident, Carter had
been charged with and convicted of domestic malicious dam-
age for breaking the defendant's windshield. 36 She was re-
quired to undergo domestic violence counseling. Before trial
30. See Pre-Briefing Statement of the Defendant-Appellant at 4, State v. Gon-
salves, No. 2000-256-C.A. (R.I. Feb. 8, 2002) (on file with author).
31. See infra text accompanying note 37.
32. R.I. SuP. CT. R. ART. I 12A(5).
33. Id.
34. In addition, anytime during the show cause calendar process, the court
may decide to move a case over for full briefing and argument before the entire
court. Id.
35. Gonsalves, supra note 3, at 6.
36. The Rhode Island Supreme Court may have made an error in stating that
Robin Carter had been convicted of domestic malicious damage. She had not, at
least not as defined in Rhode Island Rule of Evidence 609. She had pled nolo con-
tendre, or no contest, to the charge of domestic malicious damage, and because she
received neither prison time nor a monetary fine her plea to the charge did not
qualify as a conviction under Rhode Island law. See supra note 23.
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on the instant charge, the trial justice denied the defendant's
motion in limine to admit this evidence and also refused to
allow the defendant to speak of it during his testimony.
Relevant evidence is evidence that tends "to make the exis-
tence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence." R.I.R.Evid. 401. It is well-settled that
questions concerning the admissibility of evidence on the
grounds of relevancy are left to the sound discretion of the
trial justice, and this Court will not disturb such a ruling ab-
sent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Tassone, 749 A.2d
1112, 1117 (R.I. 2000) (citing State v. Gabriau, 696 A.2d 290,
294 (R.I. 1997)).
A trial justice may certainly preclude by pretrial ruling pur-
suant to a motion in limine, or later during trial, that coun-
sel's proposed line of questioning if it is not relevant to the
trial issue, or if the proposed questioning, even if relevant, is
outweighed by any of the reasons prescribed in Rule 403 of
the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. State v. Oliveira, 730
A.2d 20, 24 (R.I. 1999).
Rule 403 provides that "[allthough relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or mis-
leading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." A
trial justice's Rule 403 ruling is reviewed only for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Martinez, 651 A.2d 1189, 1193 (R.I. 1994).
In this case, Carter's domestic malicious damage charge oc-
curred several years before trial and was unrelated to the de-
fendant's trial. The evidence largely was irrelevant and
primarily constituted an attempt by the defendant to show
that Carter's motive for making the instant complaint was to
get even with him. The probative value of the years-earlier
incident clearly was determined to be outweighed by its prej-
udicial nature, and the trial justice properly acted within her
discretion to exclude this evidence. 37
The Rhode Island Supreme Court did not discuss the constitu-
tional issue argued by Gonsalves's attorney on appeal, despite the
proclamation in the Constitution's Supremacy Clause that "the
Judges of every State shall be bound" by the Constitution of the
37. Gonsalves, supra note 3, at 2-4.
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United States.38 Dissimilar to the analysis undertaken by the
Rhode Island Supreme Court, this case can be analyzed on a
purely constitutional level, leaving aside the rules of evidence, be-
cause the Constitution is the supreme law of the land.3 9
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused has the right to be
confronted with the witnesses against him.40 This Sixth Amend-
ment right is held by defendants in state criminal proceedings as
well as federal. 41 A primary interest secured by the Sixth Amend-
ment's confrontation clause is the right of the accused to cross-ex-
amine the witnesses testifying against him.42 "Cross-examination
is the right of the party against whom the witness is called, and
the right is a valuable means of.. . testing the... impartiality...
and integrity of the witness."43 Not only is it a right, but "in the
context of our adversary system, cross-examination is 'beyond any
doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of
truth.'" 44 And truth, after all, or "the pursuit of factually accurate
outcomes," 45 is the object of our adversarial system as a whole.
Cross-examination of a witness regarding possible bias
against a defendant, as the defense counsel desired to undertake in
State v. Gonsalves, is a constitutional issue that has been treated
as paramount to a fair trial by the United States Supreme Court.
A... particular attack on the witness'[s] credibility is effected
by means of cross-examination directed toward revealing pos-
sible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as
they may relate directly to issues or personalities in the case
at hand .... We have recognized that the exposure of a wit-
ness'[s] motivation in testifying is a proper and important
function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-
examination.46
Defense counsel in Gonsalves sought to do just that - to expose the
complaining witness's motive for testifying against the defendant.
38. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
39. Id.
40. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
41. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
42. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965).
43. The Ottawa, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 268, 271 (1865).
44. RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., EVIDENCE: TEXT, PROBLEMS, AND CASES 464
(Aspen 2002) (quoting 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAW 32 (James Chadbourn ed., 1974)).
45. Id. at 155.
46. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974).
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The trial judge prohibited this "proper and important function"
when she disallowed questioning that would establish the possible
factual basis for the complaining witness to falsify her testimony.
As in Davis v. Alaska,47 a leading confrontation clause case,
the defense counsel in Gonsalves was unable to introduce the nec-
essary facts which would illustrate that the witness might have
been biased.48 In Davis, the defendant was convicted of grand lar-
ceny and burglary for stealing a safe from a bar, and his conviction
was affirmed by Alaska's highest court.49 The United States Su-
preme Court granted certiorari to rule on the Alaska Supreme
Court's evaluation of the adequacy of the scope of the defendant's
cross-examination of a witness.50 Richard Green was a crucial wit-
ness for the prosecution, testifying at trial that he had seen the
defendant, holding a crowbar, beside a car on the side of the road.51
The stolen safe was later discovered at the spot in the road where
Green claimed to have seen the defendant. 52 The defendant's
counsel sought to cross-examine Green about possible bias in his
testimony, because he had a juvenile record and was on probation
at the time the police questioned him about the safe.53 The de-
fense counsel wanted to argue that Green had implicated the de-
fendant out of fear that he would be implicated himself.5 4 "Not
only might Green have made a hasty and faulty identification...
to shift suspicion away from himself ... ,but Green might have
been the subject of undue pressure from the police and made his
identifications under fear of possible probation revocation." 55 The
Court stated,
We cannot speculate as to whether the jury, as sole judge of
the credibility of a witness, would have accepted this line of
reasoning had counsel been permitted to fully present it. But
we do conclude that the jurors were entitled to have the bene-
fit of the defense theory before them so that they could make
an informed judgment as to the weight to place on Green's
47. 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974).
48. See id. at 318.
49. Id. at 314.
50. Id. at 315.
51. Id. at 310.
52. Id.




testimony which provided "a crucial link in the proof.., of
petitioner's act."5 6
The Court also stated that although the defense counsel was
allowed to ask Green whether he was biased, counsel was not al-
lowed to make a factual record from which to argue why Green
might have been biased.
On the basis of the limited cross-examination that was per-
mitted, the jury might well have thought that defense counsel
was engaged in a speculative and baseless attack on the cred-
ibility of an apparently blameless witness .... [I]t seems
clear to us that to make any such inquiry effective, defense
counsel should have been permitted to expose to the jury the
facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibil-
ity, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the relia-
bility of the witness. 5 7
Similarly, the defense counsel in Gonsalves should have been al-
lowed to expose the facts from which the jury could draw infer-
ences relating to the reliability of the key prosecution witness,
Robin Carter, so as to not appear to be making a baseless attack on
her credibility.
The United States Supreme Court continued to emphasize the
importance of allowing a defendant sufficient cross-examination of
key prosecution witnesses in Olden v. Kentucky.58 The defendant
Olden was indicted on charges of kidnapping, rape, and forcible
sodomy and convicted of forcible sodomy. 59 The pivotal witness in
the case was the alleged victim Matthews, who claimed that on the
night in question the defendant had forced her to have sex with
him.60 Testimony at trial established one fact upon which both
parties agreed, that Matthews's boyfriend Russell had seen Olden
drop her off at the end of the night.6 1 The defendant sought to
argue his theory of the case - that Matthews had concocted the
rape allegation when Russell saw her exiting Olden's car to avoid
endangering her relationship with Russell. 62 However, the defen-
dant was prevented from impeaching Matthews regarding the fact
56. Id. at 317 (quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 419 (1965)).
57. Id. at 318.
58. 488 U.S. 227 (1988).
59. Id. at 228, 230.
60. Id. at 228.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 230.
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that at the time of trial her relationship with Russell had contin-
ued to the point where she was indeed still in a relationship with
Russell and was living with him.6 3 The trial court held, and the
Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed, that the probative value of
the evidence in question was outweighed by the possibility of un-
fair prejudice against Matthews." The trial court stated that to
have admitted into evidence the fact that Matthews, a white wo-
man, was living with Russell, who was black, would have created
extreme prejudice against Matthews. 65
The United States Supreme Court criticized the Kentucky
Court of Appeals, because "without acknowledging the significance
of, or even adverting to, petitioner's constitutional right to confron-
tation... [it] held that petitioner's right to effective cross-examina-
tion was outweighed by the danger" of prejudice. 66 The Rhode
Island Supreme Court made the very same mistake in Gonsalves.
The courts in both cases speculated as to the possible effect of ju-
rors' biases against the witnesses to attempt to justify the exclu-
sion of cross-examination with strong potential to demonstrate the
falsity of testimony that was crucial to the prosecutions' cases.6 7
Trial judges do have wide latitude "to impose reasonable limits
on . . . cross-examination based on concerns about harassment,
prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness's safety, or interro-
gation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant."68 However,
none of those issues was present to a significant degree in Gon-
salves. The danger of prejudice, which as previously established
means the possibility of the jury making a decision in the case on
an improper basis, was minimal. Possible improper bases, based
on the excluded evidence, upon which jurors could have made a
decision, are (1) the possibility that the jurors would decide to ac-
quit the defendant because, although they thought the defendant
was guilty, they also thought that the complaining witness, having
been convicted of domestic malicious damage, did not deserve the
protection of the law due to a completely innocent victim, and (2)
the possibility that the jurors would disbelieve the complaining
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 231.
66. Id. at 232.
67. See id.
68. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986).
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witness because of her domestic malicious damage charge. Those
scenarios were unlikely, and when compared to the high probative
value of the excluded evidence it is clear that the probative value
was not substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice.
[A] criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation
Clause by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in
otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a
prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and
thereby "to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors...
could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability
of the witness."6 9
Wayne Gonsalves stated such a violation of the Confrontation
Clause in his appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, but the
court did not see fit to reverse Gonsalves's conviction and grant
him a new trial. In Chapman v. California,70 the United States
Supreme Court held that an error in limiting cross-examination
requires reversal of the conviction unless it is found to be harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt by the reviewing court. 71 "[Tihe consti-
tutionally improper denial of a defendant's opportunity to impeach
a witness for bias, like other Confrontation Clause errors, is sub-
ject to Chapman harmless-error analysis."72
Whether such error is harmless in a particular case depends
upon a host of factors, all readily accessible to reviewing
courts. These factors include the importance of the wit-
ness'[s] testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testi-
mony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence
corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on
material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise
permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecu-
tion's case.73
The error in Gonsalves was not harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Without the testimony of the complaining witness the pros-
ecution likely would not have had a case against Gonsalves. The
testimony was not cumulative, as the complaining witness was the
only person to claim to have witnessed the alleged assault. The
only evidence corroborating the complaining witness's story was
69. Id. at 680 (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974)).
70. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
71. Id. at 24.
72. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684.
73. Id.
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that of a police officer who did not claim to have witnessed the as-
sault, but instead testified to having seen red marks on the neck of
the complaining witness shortly after the alleged assault.74 Also,
while the defense attorney was allowed to cross-examine the com-
plaining witness on a variety of issues, he was not able to ask ques-
tions relevant to establishing that the complaining witness had
fabricated the assault by the defendant in order to get back at him
because she had been ordered to attend domestic violence counsel-
ing as a result of their previous confrontation. All together, the
strength of the prosecution's case was not great, and the cross-ex-
amination of the complaining witness as to her motive to fabricate
was an enormous part of the defendant's case, as the excluded
questioning could reasonably have caused the jury to question
whether the complaining witness fabricated her story. Therefore,
Gonsalves's conviction should have been reversed and a new trial
granted by the Rhode Island Supreme Court, based on the viola-
tion at trial of his Sixth Amendment right to a reasonable cross-
examination of the prosecution's key witness, and because the con-
stitutional error at trial was not harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.
This analysis of State v. Gonsalves will serve as a background
for the following arguments on why the Rhode Island Supreme
Court should publish opinions for all of its criminal case decisions.
Gonsalves will be referenced throughout the remainder of this
Comment to show how the arguments for publication have practi-
cal application and to show that there should be significant con-
cern over the potential for injustice that now exists in the Rhode
Island court system.
II. THE JUSTICE SYSTEM - WHY ALL CRIMINAL DECISIONS
SHOULD BE PUBLISHED
This Part operates on the author's belief that the goal of any
criminal justice system should be to secure justice for criminal of-
fenders, for victims of crime, and for society as a whole. While any
definition of justice is subjective, a transparent criminal justice
system will more likely achieve justice, whatever one's meaning of
that may be, than a system that is opaque.
74. Trial Record at 107-08, State v. Gonsalves, C.A. No. P3/98-4505A (R.I.
Super. Ct. filed June 13, 2000).
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A. Every Judgment Has a Generative Power
All Rhode Island Supreme Court criminal case decisions
should yield published opinions, because, even if the substantive
law that is applied in a given case is nothing novel, the facts of any
case may have precedential value for a future factually similar
case. Thus, though the statement of the law may not be precedent-
setting, the facts of two cases may be so similar as to lead the par-
ties or the court to conclude that the law applied in the first case
should be applied in the second, as well. 7 5 Cases are not decided,
and laws are not applied, in a vacuum, but only in the context of
facts.
In a 1986 article on unpublished opinions, George Weaver,
quoting in part Justice Benjamin Cardozo, said, "'Every judgment
has a generative power. It begets in its own image. Every prece-
dent.., has a directive force for future cases of the same or similar
nature.' Law-making in this broader sense is especially important
in appellate courts of last resort."76 This broad sense of law mak-
ing is one of the duties of the Rhode Island Supreme Court. Pre-
sumably, if a case substantially similar in its facts to State v.
Gonsalves were brought in a Rhode Island court, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court would want the new case to be decided correctly,
or, in other words, to be decided consistently with the Rhode Island
Supreme Court's statement of the law and its decision in Gon-
salves. This would be logical because, although unpublished or-
ders are not citable as precedent under Rhode Island law, the
justices of the Rhode Island Supreme Court presumably want to
see justice done through consistent application of the law.
Earl Warren, as Chief Justice of the United States Supreme
Court, wrote in a case involving obscenity that the Supreme Court
heard such cases "not merely to rule upon the alleged obscenity of
a specific film or book but to establish principles for the guidance of
lower courts and legislatures. Yet most of our decisions [in this
area] have been given without opinion and have thus failed to fur-
75. However, as was established earlier, unpublished Rhode Island Supreme
Court orders are not citable as precedent in Rhode Island courts either by the
judge or by parties. R.I. SuP. CT. R. ART. I 16(h) (2002).
76. George M. Weaver, The Precedential Value of Unpublished Judicial Opin-
ions, 39 MERCER L. REv. 477,481 (1986) (quoting BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE
OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 21-22 (1921)).
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nish such guidance." 77 The Rhode Island Supreme Court, as the
highest, and in fact the only, appellate level court in its state, has
an obligation to provide such guidance to the lower courts of the
state. When looking for interpretation of the law of Rhode Island,
there is nowhere else for federal courts, lower courts of Rhode Is-
land, and practitioners to turn.
B. Unpublished Decisions as Secret Precedent
Closely related to the discussion in section A above is the argu-
ment that all criminal case decisions should yield published opin-
ions, and thereby be citable, because of the possibility that
unpublished orders will be adhered to as a type of unofficial prece-
dent by lower court judges.78 Trial court judges may treat unpub-
lished orders as binding precedent, notwithstanding the
prohibition of judges relying on such orders as precedent, in order
to avoid having their decisions overturned on appeal. 79 For exam-
ple, a Rhode Island Superior Court judge hearing a case similar to
State v. Gonsalves may be tempted to look to the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court's order in Gonsalves for direction on how to rule on
issues that arise in the new case. Whereas, as argued in section A,
it is desirable to have the Rhode Island Supreme Court provide
guidance about the law to the lower courts, as well as to have the
lower courts follow that guidance, it is not desirable for this to hap-
pen when the parties to a case are neither aware of a lower court's
adherence to an unpublished order nor allowed to analogize their
case to or distinguish their case from such an order in their briefs
and oral arguments.
In reality, a decision of a lower court judge to base a ruling on
an unpublished order, even though it is not citable as precedent, to
conform her ruling to what she believes is the current state of the
law, would be a choice that is neither surprising nor necessarily
flawed. Predicting how an appellate court would rule on an issue
is, essentially, the job of a lower court. As stated more eloquently
77. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 200 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
78. See generally Weaver, supra note 76 (arguing that because unpublished
opinions have the same dispute settling capacity as published opinions, they
should be citable as persuasive authority). Also, the reader should note that al-
though the Gonsalves decision and many other decisions are not published, they




by Justice Learned Hand, "I conceive that the measure of a lower
court's duty is to divine, as best it can, what would be the event of
an appeal in the case before it."80 If this is, indeed, the duty of a
lower court, then the lower court judge should have at her disposal
all of the resources that might assist her in making such a determi-
nation, including all past decisions of the Rhode Island Supreme
Court.
Also, a lower court judge should not have the burden that nec-
essarily comes with knowing of a Rhode Island Supreme Court
opinion yet at the same time knowing that she is not technically
bound by that same opinion. Given this burden, lower court
judges' awareness of both published and unpublished opinions may
cause confusion and inconsistency in the lower courts as to what
value to give the various opinions. One federal district court ex-
pressed similar dismay at this quandary: "Although [this] Court is
mindful of the Fourth Circuit's admonition that [unpublished]
memorandum decisions are not to be accorded precedential
value,... the legal trend evinced by these four memorandum deci-
sions, with all seven active judges participating in one or more of
them, leads [this] Court to the conclusion that [the law laid out in
these memoranda] is now the law in this circuit.. .. 8 Similarly,
since the Rhode Island Supreme Court spoke as a single unit in its
unpublished order in Gonsalves, a lower court judge would be justi-
fied in determining that what was written in the unpublished or-
der is, in fact, the law in Rhode Island. By making this
determination in the course of ruling on issues in a new case, the
lower court judge would be fulfilling her judicial responsibility.
However, she would also be depriving the parties in the new case
of the opportunity to argue either for or against adherence to the
unpublished order. As was exhibited in Part I, a party's opportu-
nity to distinguish his case from an unpublished order could be
crucial to the outcome of his case. After all, "persons should not be
punished for the violation of a law 'not sufficiently promul-
gated,'"8 2 and an unpublished order, like the one in Gonsalves, is
80. Specter Motor Serv. v. Walsh, 139 F.2d 809, 823 (2d Cir. 1944) (Hand, J.,
dissenting).
81. Durkin v. Davis, 390 F. Supp. 249, 254 (E.D. Va. 1975), rev'd on other
grounds, 538 F.2d 1037 (4th Cir. 1976).
82. Weaver, supra note 76, at 487 (quoting JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUC-
TION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 173 (1948)).
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essentially this kind of law, because it has not been disseminated
to the public.
C. The Sacrificing of the Best Possible Legal Response
All Rhode Island Supreme Court criminal case decisions
should yield published opinions because a justice, knowing that he
will not be personally signing an order and that the order will be
neither published nor citable, will not be subject to the same qual-
ity control pressures as when he is writing an opinion that is to be
published.8 3 First, an opinion that is not published will not be sub-
ject to the same scrutiny by the legal community and by the public
as an opinion that is published. Justice Robert G. Flanders, Jr. of
the Rhode Island Supreme Court has noted that a judge's opinions
that will not be published will "not tend to be as fully articulated,
as pointedly researched, or as convincingly argued as they are
when they have been embodied in a written draft... that the au-
thor has prepared for eventual publication."8 4
Second, there may also be a need to prevent the court from
concealing questionable decisions.8 5 The court should not be able
to hide a decision that may have been made in less than good faith
or with less than legal accuracy from practitioners or from the pub-
lic. If every decision is published as a full opinion, justices will
know that every decision is subject to a critique by those people
that are qualified to judge the judges. Third, there should be some
concern over whether judges are taking sufficient responsibility for
the opinions that originate in their chambers. While it is widely
accepted as both necessary and proper to have a law clerk do the
initial drafting of an appellate opinion, it is questionable whether a
judge gives an opinion that is not to be published the same supervi-
sory attention that he gives to an opinion that will be published
and that he will sign personally.
Justice Flanders has also written, "The substance of appellate
judging - providing the best possible judicial response to the legal
83. See Charles E. Carpenter, The No-Citation Rule for Unpublished Opin-
ions: Do the Ends of Expediency for Overloaded Appellate Courts Justify the Means
of Secrecy?, 50 S.C. L. REV. 235, 247 (1998) (arguing that the non-citability of un-
published opinions sacrifices the quality of appellate decisions).
84. Robert G. Flanders, Jr., The Utility of Separate Judicial Opinions in Ap-
pellate Courts of Last Resort: Why Dissents Are Valuable, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REV. 401, 409 (1999).
85. See Carpenter, supra note 83.
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problems posed by the cases and controversies that are appealed to
courts of last resort - must never be sacrificed to appease the un-
slakable gods of collegiality and civility... ."86 The Rhode Island
Supreme Court's "best possible judicial response" should also never
be sacrificed for the sake of convenience or efficiency. However, it
is quite possible, as evidenced by State v. Gonsalves, that this "best
possible judicial response" is currently being sacrificed as a result
of the Rhode Island Supreme Court's policy regarding publication
of opinions and orders. It is also quite possible, then, that it is time
to change this policy.
III. PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS OF RHODE ISLAND
Part II of this Comment discussed reasons for publication of
opinions that may apply to any state or federal jurisdiction. This
Part, with the uniqueness of Rhode Island in mind and for reasons
that may not be as applicable to other states, discusses why Rhode
Island both should and can publish opinions for all of its supreme
court criminal case decisions.
A. Rhode Islanders as Addicts and Abuse Victims - A Step
Forward
The Rhode Island Supreme Court's adoption of a practice of
publishing opinions for all of its criminal case decisions would be a
small measure toward engendering much-needed public trust in
and respect for Rhode Island's government. Government in the
State of Rhode Island has a reputation for corruption and se-
crecy.8 7 In just the past two decades, Rhode Island has exper-
ienced a plethora of events involving corruption in state and city
government.8 8 Numerous elected officials have been convicted of
crimes involving their offices, including former Pawtucket Mayor
Brian Sarault, former Rhode Island Governor Edward DiPrete and
former Providence Mayor Vincent "Buddy" Cianci.8 9 Two members
of the Rhode Island Supreme Court itself have resigned in the face
86. Flanders, supra note 84, at 423.
87. See Mark Sappenfield, Legacy of Scandal Mars Rhode Island, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 11, 2001, § 1 at 3.
88. See Scott MacKay, The DiPrete Case: A History of Public Malfeasance from
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of revelations of unethical conduct and the prospect of impeach-
ment: Chief Justice Joseph Bevilacqua in 1991 and Chief Justice
Thomas Fay in 199390
These instances of individual corruption, together with contro-
versial situations like the collapse of the Rhode Island Share and
Deposit Indemnity Corporation (RISDIC),91 the lack of adequate
separation of powers among the three branches of Rhode Island
government, 92 and the three ring circus that has in recent years
been the Rhode Island Ethics Commission, 93 have subjected Rhode
Islanders to more than their fair share of public corruption and
impropriety and have developed in Rhode Islanders a distrust of
government and governmental officials, while at the same time in-
stilling in them a tolerance for and sense of amusement in public
corruption likely unmatched elsewhere. Edward Achorn, deputy
editorial-pages editor of The Providence Journal, pointed out that
Rhode Islanders "often seem not outraged, not even mildly dis-
gusted, but, rather, delighted [by the corruption in Rhode Island].
'Only in Rhode Island,' they sigh, with native pride, a twinkle in
their eye."9 4 On the other hand, Achorn also compared Rhode Is-
landers to victims of spousal abuse. 95 "Rhode Islanders are quick
with excuses and fond of hoping things will get better if they sim-
ply endure. When their politicians beat them, choke them and rob
90. See R.I. GEN. ASSEM., RHODE ISLAND HISTORY: CHAPTER IX, THE ERA OF
REFORM, 1984-2000, at http'J/www.rilin.state.ri.us/studteaguide/RhodeIslandHis-
tory/chapt9.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
91. See id. RISDIC was the organization that insured state-chartered credit
unions, and its failure in 1991, in which credit union and RISDIC officials were
implicated, left thousands of Rhode Island depositors without the money they had
saved in Rhode Island credit unions. Id. Governor Bruce Sundlun later signed
legislation that created the Depositors Economic Protection Corporation, which
was charged with taking over the assets of the failed credit unions and using the
proceeds, in addition to borrowed state funds, to make the depositors whole. Id.
92. See Carl T. Bogus, A Radical Decision by the Rhode Island Supreme Court,
48 R.I. B.J. 13 (1999).
93. See Common Cause of Rhode Island, Key Issues: Ethics, at httpJ/
www.commoncauseri.org/issues.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2003). The Rhode Is-
land Ethics Commission, which has in recent years become dominated by lawyers
with political connections, has itself been the subject of numerous ethics com-
plaints. Id.




them, they laugh it off, cover up their bruises and insist that, deep
down, those guys really love them."96
Publication of opinions for all criminal case decisions by the
Rhode Island Supreme Court will not eliminate the persistent
problem of unclean government in Rhode Island. It would, how-
ever, be a step in the direction of alleviating the sickness that
seems to plague Rhode Islanders, Rhode Island's government and
Rhode Island's public officials. Robert P. Hey, a native Rhode Is-
lander and former senior editor of the Christian Science Monitor,
remarked, "Addicts often require multiple efforts to kick their ad-
dictions, and Rhode Island, in my viewing, has been struggling
with its habit for only 60 years or so."97 Transparency in the judi-
ciary can help Rhode Islanders, especially Rhode Island public offi-
cials, to overcome their addiction to the soap-opera-like quality of
corruption in government. Allowing for public scrutiny of the work
of the state's highest court, in which the current non-citability of
unpublished opinions has been compared by one author to "the
clang of a door being closed,"98 can assist in bringing that trans-
parency about.
The keeping of any government's decision-making rationale
from public scrutiny breeds distrust by the populace and should be
avoided when possible. "[Dlespite Rhode Island's reputation and
history as a haven for the contrary-minded, its highest court has
largely functioned as a bastion of monolithic solidarity."99 This
"bastion of monolithic solidarity" needs to have its doors thrown
wide open, so people will both feel confident in and be informed
about the workings of the court and their government as a whole.
B. A Shining State upon a Hill
Finally, it is likely that the above arguments will be met by
questions concerning the practicality and feasibility of publication
of opinions for all Rhode Island Supreme Court criminal case deci-
sions. It is necessary to address these questions, because even
those conceding that the above arguments for publication are con-
vincing may doubt whether publication of opinions for all criminal
96. Id.
97. Robert P. Hey, No Place Like Rhode Island, CnRisTIAN Sci. MONITOR, May
5, 2002, § 1 at 11.
98. Carpenter, supra note 83, at 236.
99. Flanders, supra note 84, at 422.
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case decisions is possible, due to either time or financial restric-
tions. In reality, however, these cost and time-consumption con-
cerns in Rhode Island may pale in comparison to the same
concerns in court systems where the output of criminal cases far
exceeds that of Rhode Island.'00 Rhode Island's may be one court
system where publication of opinions for all criminal case decisions
is not only desirable, but also feasible. First, the small size of the
state' 01 and the reasonably light criminal caseload of the Rhode
Island Supreme Court make publication of opinions for all criminal
case decisions possible. The average annual number of criminal
cases disposed of by the Rhode Island Supreme Court in the years
1997-2001 was approximately ninety-three cases.10 2 If every one
of these disposed-of criminal cases were accompanied by a publish-
able opinion, that would require each justice to write eighteen or
nineteen publishable criminal case opinions per year. Second, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court already publishes opinions for the
majority of its criminal case decisions, 10 3 so the additional writing
burden on the justices and the additional financial strain on the
court system will likely not be prohibitive.
Rhode Island, having the capability that many other states
may not have to achieve publication of opinions for one hundred
percent of its criminal case decisions, should take advantage of its
small size by taking a large step toward open government and jus-
tice for all of its citizens. "It is one of the happy incidents of the
federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country."10 4 Rhode Is-
land should be that laboratory.
100. This is simply due to size and population. Rhode Island is, in fact, the
smallest state in the United States by area, and among the smallest by population.
THE 2002 WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 363 (Williams A. McGeveran, Jr.
ed., World Almanac Education Group 2001).
101. Id.
102. ADMIN. OFFICE OF STATE COURTS, STATE OF R.I., 2001 REPORT ON THE JUDI-
CIARY 33 (2002). Criminal cases disposed of by the Rhode Island Supreme Court in
the years 1997-2001 were as follows: 1997: 98 cases, 1998: 79 cases, 1999: 98 cases,
2000: 95 cases, 2001: 96 cases. Id. These criminal cases are appeals from Rhode
Island Superior Court (trial level) criminal cases, of which the Rhode Island Supe-
rior Court disposed of 6,649 in 1997, 6,573 in 1998, 6,420 in 1999, 6,018 in 2000,
and 6,212 in 2001. Id. at 34-35. See also infra Appendix.
103. See infra Appendix.
104. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.
dissenting).
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Going forward with instituting a policy of publishing an opin-
ion for every Rhode Island Supreme Court criminal case decision is
an opportunity that should be seized by the Rhode Island Supreme
Court. It is an opportunity for Rhode Island to be a shining city
upon a hill' 0 5 in regards to the openness of its judiciary. Rhode
Island can serve as an example for other states and the federal
system to at least aspire to, whether or not they have the same
capability to achieve complete publication of opinions for all crimi-
nal case decisions.
CONCLUSION
A couple of lessons can be drawn from State v. Gonsalves and
from the Rhode Island Supreme Court's practice of not publishing
opinions for all of its criminal case decisions. The first is relevant
to proving the thesis of this Comment. It has been said that what
a person does while no one is watching is the true measure of that
person's character. If so, then is it also true that what a court does
in its unpublished opinions is the true measure of a court's charac-
ter? By failing to give the federal constitutional law issue in State
v. Gonsalves adequate consideration, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court treated the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause as un-
important and created an appearance that the court may not have
given a good faith effort when deciding this case, regardless of
whether that is true. Considering the example of State v. Gon-
salves, in which the Rhode Island Supreme Court failed to address
a basic constitutional right, the court can no longer be allowed to
operate as a clandestine institution outside of the watchful eyes of
the public and the bar.
105. The idea of a city, state, or nation being a "shining city upon a hill" was
first expressed by John Winthrop in 1630, when he "delivered a sermon ... which
contained this idea that the new colony of Massachusetts Bay would be an example
to the world of... a peacefully interdependent and cooperative community ....
They would, he said, be a shining 'city upon a hill' for all to see and all would follow
their example." The University of Louisiana-Monroe, at http://www.ulm.edu/
~eller/amlit/focus/defs/city.htm (Nov. 2, 2002). Since then, this idea of a "city upon
a hill" has been endorsed as the ambition of the United States of America by people
as diverse in ideology as Supreme Court Justice William Brennan and President
Ronald Reagan. See Bradley C. Canon, Book Review, LAW & POL. BOOK REV. Nov.
1999, at 489-92, http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/lpbr/subpages/reviews/michelman.
htm; President Ronald Reagan, Farwell Speech Broadcast to the Nation (Jan. 20,
1989), at http://reagan.webteamone.com/speeches/farewell.cfn.
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The other lesson is that there are no small injustices. Al-
though Wayne DaRosa Gonsalves's conviction was one for which
he received only a year's probation, not a life sentence, and while
there may be degrees of injustice whereby wrongly receiving a life
sentence is arguably more unjust than receiving a year's probation,
there can be no question that a line exists between justice and in-
justice, and that once that line is crossed any injustice is a harmful
one to society. There is also a line between a system that results in
instances of injustice and a system that institutionally invites in-
justice. While no system of laws can wholly eliminate aberrational
instances of injustice, Rhode Islanders as a society cannot tolerate
a system of laws that has institutionalized the creation of opportu-
nities for injustice. It is the difference between the exception that
proves the rule and the exception that swallows the rule. The rule
must be justice, and one way to move toward achieving a greater
measure of justice is to make government as open and transparent
as possible. Publishing an opinion for every single criminal case
decision made by the Rhode Island Supreme Court is a step toward
transparency, and a step toward justice.
Jonathan E. Pincince*
* The author would like to thank Rhode Island Supreme Court Associate
Justices Robert G. Flanders, Jr. and Maureen McKenna Goldberg, both of whom
were accessible and candid in sitting down with the author for a conversation
about the topic of this Comment. The author is also grateful to Professors Andrew
Horwitz and Robert Kent of Roger Williams University Ralph R. Papitto School of
Law for their assistance throughout the writing of this Comment, as well as Cathy
Gibran and the editorial board of the Roger Williams University Law Review.




RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT - MANNER OF DISPOSITION OF
CRIMINAL CASES IN 1997 - 2002
Disposition 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Criminal Cases
Disposed Of 98 79 98 95 96 n/a 10 7
Published Opinions
and Orders 79 56 55 61 68 64
Per-Curiam
Opinions 10 8  15 15 23 27 25 30
Signed Opinions 10 9  34 25 21 29 34 26
Orders11 O 30 16 11 5 9 8
Unpublished
Decisions 19 23 43 34 28 n/a 1 1
Annual Averages
Disposition Totals 1997-2001 1997-2001
Criminal Cases Disposed Of 466 93.2
Published Opinions and Orders 319 63.8
Per Curiam Opinions 105 21
Signed Opinions 143 28.6
Orders 71 14.2
Unpublished Decisions 147 29.4
106. The numbers of criminal cases disposed of annually were taken from the
2001 Report on the Rhode Island Judiciary, p. 33, which is on file with the author
and is also obtainable for no charge by contacting the Rhode Island Supreme Court
by telephone at 401-222-3274. The remainder of the figures in this chart were
gathered through the use of the legal research service Westlaw® at http:l/
www.westlaw.com.
107. This data was not available at the time of publication, but can be obtained
from the Rhode Island Supreme Court when it releases its 2002 Report on the
Rhode Island Judiciary either in print or at http://www.ricourts.com.
108. Per Curiam opinions are opinions issued by the Rhode Island Supreme
Court that are not individually signed by one or more justices, but instead
represent the opinion of the Rhode Island Supreme Court as a whole.
109. Signed opinions are opinions issued by the Rhode Island Supreme Court
that are written and signed by at least one justice representing a majority of the
Court.
110. Orders are issued for cases summarily decided by the Rhode Island
Supreme Court pursuant to the process described supra note 1. Orders do
represent a majority decision of the court, but, like per curiam opinions, are not
signed by the justices.
111. See supra note 105. The reader is now aware of one unpublished decision
from 2002, State v. Gonsalves.

